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IDA'S WAY:  CONSTRUCTING THE RESPECT-
WORTHY GOVERNMENTAL  SYSTEM
Frank  L  Michelman*
This  is  for  Dean  John  Feerick.  It  is  about  him,  too,  in  a  way,
although  it may not appear  to be.  It  is  about character, civility, and
good  will.  It is about what is required  of a group  of people, and their
leaders,  who find  themselves,  for very good  and strong reasons, in  a
certain  situation  of  the  greatest  interest  to  political  thought:
determined  to  stick  together,  but  to  do  so  in  ways  and  under
conditions that all know will require each to submit himself or herself
to an  endless series of binding, collective  decisions,  affecting  matters
dear  to  the hearts  of many or of all,  about  which  they  expect  to be
divided by profound, intractable disagreements.
I am not presuming  to suggest  that such  has recently  been the case
of the Fordham University School of Law or its faculty.  (Who would I
be  to know?)  It can, of course, be thus with faculties; but faculties-
much  as  I  cherish  them-are  not my  main concern  in what  follows.
Rather, I have in mind the situation of members of a modern political
society, seen as  a great deal of contemporary political philosophy has
been  inclined  to  see  it.  Liberal  theory  lately  has  given  a  lot  of
attention to the existence  of such disagreement  as I have  mentioned,
and  to  the  question  of how, in  view  of  "this  fact of pluralism,"  the
coercion  implicit  in  any  possible  practice  of  legal  ordering,  or
government by law, can possibly be morally appropriate.1
I.  "INTEGRITY"  IN A NEW KEY
A.  Goods of Union
Suppose  you believed  all  of the following-never  mind  right  now
why you might; we'll get to that.2  First:  A law (a legal rule, principle,
*  Robert  Walmsley  University  Professor,  Harvard  University.  I  am  indebted  to
Jeremy Waldron  for a crucial suggestion.
1.  See,  e.g.,  John  Rawls,  Political  Liberalism  36-37  (1996)  (positing  "general
facts" of "reasonable  pluralism"  and of "oppression");  id. at 217 (proposing  a "liberal
principle of legitimacy").
2.  See infra Part II.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
or norm) can be validly "in  force"  in a country regardless  of whether
that law is witless, vicious, unjust, or all of the above.  (So it does not
seem to you, as it did to St. Augustine, that an unjust law is "no law at
all."3)  Second,  in some countries-though  not all-governments  are
morally justified in demanding everyone's compliance with all the laws
that the judges in that country  treat as  validly in force,  regardless  of
the  moral  and  other  merits  and  demerits  of  any given  law.  Third,
inhabitants of such  countries can be  morally justified in collaborating
with  the  government's  efforts  to  secure  such  compliance,  using
coercive means if necessary, regardless of any adverse convictions that
they, themselves, may hold regarding the merits of any law.  Fourth, it
is very much  in the  moral  and other interests  of everyone  in  a given
country  that the  second  and  third  propositions  in this  series  should
hold true  there.  Countries  in which  those  two  propositions do  hold
true  are  morally  and  otherwise  well-ordered  in  a  way  that  other
countries are not.
Here,  in a  nutshell,  is  why:  Only where  the  propositions do  hold
true (so runs the set of beliefs we are positing) can inhabitants partake
of certain great "goods of the political"4 or-as I sometimes shall  call
them-goods  of "union."  This result  is owing,  in part, to what  John
Rawls,  himself  approving  it,  called  "Hobbes'  thesis."'  Without  the
government's  known and proven readiness  to step  in as necessary  to
make  sure that  everyone  plays by the rules, the  country's practice  of
legal ordering, or government  by law, by which the goods of union are
produced, could not be expected to hold together.  On the other hand,
though,  it will  not  serve  our moral  interests  to have  those goods  of
union  produced  by morally reprehensible  means.  In order, then, for
our moral interests  to be served, it would have to be the case that the
second and third propositions in this series hold true.
Fifth, whether  those  two propositions  (the second and third  of the
series) hold true in any given country  depends  on the general  system
of government  and  lawmaking  in place  in  that country.  They  do if,
and only if, that country's general  system of government  is in certain
crucial respects reliable or, as I shall say, "respect-worthy."  It follows,
if the fourth proposition in the series has been accepted, that everyone
has  a very strong reason for wishing the system  of government in his
or her country to be, in the relevant sense, respect-worthy.
Summarizing  in reverse, the set of beliefs  we are positing  comes to
this: On  condition  that  a country's  system  of government  is respect-
3.  See  St.  Thomas  Aquinas, The  Summa  Theologica,  Part One  of the  Second
Part, Question  95:  Of Human  Law,  Second Article,  Objection  4, reprinted  in George
C. Christie & Patrick H. Martin, Jurisprudence: Text and  Readings on the Philosophy
of Law 166 (2d ed. 1995)  (reporting and endorsing St. Augustine's remark).
4.  See Rawls, supra note 1, at 139,  157 (discussing "the very great public good" of
the political).
5.  Id. at 211.
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worthy  (in  a  certain  sense  still  to  be  developed),  inhabitants  are
morally justified in collaborating  in universal networks of compulsion
to  comply  with  all  the  legal  products  of that  system.  Being  thus
justified is very much in the moral interest of the inhabitants, because
only  on  the  condition  of  (more  or  less)  everyone's  guaranteed
compliance  (most  of  the  time)  with  all  of  the  laws  can  inhabitants
secure  to themselves  and their fellows a  package  of very great  moral
goods  of political  union,  through  their  practice  of  legal  ordering  or
government by law.
Of course, you don't have to believe any of it.  But suppose you did.
B.  The "Governmental Totality"
Suppose you believe it all.  In order, then, to tell whether you have
the valued moral warrant for collaboration in your country's networks
of legal  compulsion, you  will  have  to pass judgment  on the  respect-
worthiness  of your  country's general  system of government  currently
in place.  In order to do that, you must be able  to see and to say what
that system  is.  How, then, will you go about constructing your image
of what "the system" is?
At this  point,  I am  going  to suggest  one  possible  way  of doing  it.
Possible  alternatives  will  appear  later.6  You  could  start  with  the
obvious  idea  that  the  "system"  or  "practice"  of government  whose
respect-worthiness  you want to gauge consists of the entire aggregate
of concrete  political  and  legal  institutions,  practices,  laws, and  legal
interpretations currently in force or occurrent in the country.  Call this
"the  governmental  totality."  It  would  be,  in  effect,  the  currently
surviving deposit of the country's entire history to date of institutional
and legal  creation and  revision.  Notice that, if your country happens
to  be  one  that  relies  substantially  on  judicial  rulings  to  steer  or
constrain decisions on matters of substance -such  as the permissibility
of  abortion,  the  use  of  affirmative  action  measures,  the
implementation  of the death penalty, the  legal regulation  of the flow
of money  in  politics,  the  use  of  the  public budget  to  provide  direct
support  for  sectarian  religious  education,  the  obligations  of  the
government  to  provide  positively  for  people's  basic  civic  needs,
interests,  and  opportunities,  etc.-then  (but  only  then)  the  current
governmental  totality will be composed,  in  significant  part, of major,
extant judicial rulings on such matters.
Looking  out  at this  governmental  totality,  one  might  ask  oneself
how  various classes  or  groups  of persons are  faring, and maybe  how
they  would  perceive  matters  from  their  own  situations  and
standpoints.  One would apply whatever standards of freedom, justice,
prosperity,  distribution,  participation,  and  systemic  openness  to
change  one  considers  to  be  applicable.  Finally,  one  would  judge
6.  See infra Part III.
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whether  the  total  performance  is  good  enough,  on  the  whole,  to be
accepted  considering  the  practical,  imaginable  alternatives.  If  one
judged  that it would be, say, foolhardy to answer this question  with a
"no,"  then,  keeping  Hobbes'  thesis  in  mind,  one  might  judge  the
governmental  totality  to be  respect-worthy.  Consequently,  everyone
would  be  justified  in  collaborating  in  the  country's  networks  of
inducement  and,  where  needed,  compulsion, of universal  compliance
with every law that issues from the system.
C.  "Integration"  ("Rational Reconstruction")7
It seems  that a  person attempting  to gauge  the respect-worthiness
of her county's extant system of government in this total-performance
way  will  have  to  proceed  in  a  manner  rather  like  that  of  Ronald
Dworkin's  legendary  Judge  Hercules.'  To  keep  this  non-official
personage  distinct from Hercules  the judge, I'll call her Ida.  On any
given  occasion,  Ida,  like  Hercules,  is  aiming  to  make  a  judgment.
Perhaps in  the wake  of  some repellent  governmental  action  or legal
outcome  from the  system of government in place  in her  country, Ida
feels called upon to say whether that system continues to be one that
she  judges  respect-worthy-worth  preserving-even  at  the  cost  of
supporting enforcement of bad and wrong laws issuing from it.  Such a
judgment, regarding  the moral  merit of the system, requires that Ida
have  in view  a more  refined specification  of what the  system is  than
she  can  get  from  just  staring  at  the  total,  aggregate  mass  of  raw,
undigested, political  and legal  data  found  in  the  national  annals  and
archives.  Ida  will  have  to  connect  the  dots into normative  patterns
and  principles.  She  will  have  to  extrapolate  some  major,  implicit
normative leanings  and trend-lines.  She  will have  to make some kind
of  start,  at  least,  toward  cooking  the  raw  data  into  an  incipient,
normative political theory.
It thus appears that  Ida's problem resembles  Hercules'.  Like him,
she must refine her country's raw, historical record of lawmaking  and
related  events  into  a  more  or  less  clear  picture  of  what  she  then
(having  produced  the  picture)  will  consider  the  country's  central,
defining,  political-moral  commitments.  It  is  those  defining
commitments, thus  depicted, that will compose  the "system"  that Ida
will find  to be, or not to be,  sufficiently  worth preserving  to  warrant
support  of every  law that issues from  it  (in  view of Hobbes'  thesis),
7.  See,  e.g.,  Jurgen  Habermas,  Between  Facts  and  Norms  59  (W.  Rehg  trans.,
1996)  (using  the  term  "rational  reconstruction"  to  signify  an  "articulation"  of "the
normative  substance  of the  most  trustworthy  intuitions  of  our  everyday  political
practice, as well as the substance  of the best traditions of our political  culture"); id. at
197,  211,  222  (using  the  same  term  to  describe  Ronald  Dworkin's  account  of
adjudicative work).
8.  See  Ronald  Dworkin,  Hard Cases, in  Taking  Rights  Seriously  81,  105-30
(1977); see also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire passim (1986).
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regardless of moral or other faults  in any of those  laws taken on their
own.  It seems that the only way by which Ida can hope to draw such a
systemic picture, from  what starts  out as a byte-by-byte  record  of the
country's  legal  and  governmental  history,  is  the  one  Hercules  uses:
Treat  the record as  if it were  made  by an  acting subject  that has,  or
has been developing, a consistent set of political-moral intentions, as a
person of integrity would.
Nor does the parallel with Hercules, J.,  end  there.  Just as Hercules
is  destined to do, so is Ida bound to sense or perceive  more than one
plausible  construction  of  the  performance  history  to  date.  These
could  include  at  least  one  construction  she  regards  as  projecting  a
governmental  practice  that is  respect-worthy or worth preserving  and
at least one she  does not.  Perhaps Ida, like  Hercules, will operate on
the  premise  that  the  "correct"  construction  is  the  one  that  reflects
what  she  finds  to  be  the  most  morally  redemptive  set  of  basic
principles  that  "fits"  the  data  about  as  well  as  any  morally  inferior
competing  construction  does.  If  so,  then  she,  like  Hercules,  will  be
brushing aside a certain fraction  of inimical judicial  rulings and  other
pieces  of  the  totality  as  "mistakes"  that  she,  optimistically,  allows
herself to expect will  give way to correction,  if not tomorrow  then in
the not-too-distant future.
For  an  especially  clear  and  dramatic  illustration,  consider  an
American  Ida  in  1857,  newly  confronted  with  the  Supreme  Court's
decision in Dred Scott v.  Sandford. 9  In that case,  the  Court declared
its view that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the  Constitution."1  It held that slavery, therefore,  could
not be prevented by federal law from spreading into the pre-statehood
territories  of  the  United  States  without  contravening  the  Fifth
Amendment's guarantee  against deprivations of property without due
process of law.  Coming in the wake of earlier, ostensibly pro-slavery
decisions,12  the Dred Scott ruling  struck  many  free-soil  advocates  (or
so they  claimed)  as  reflecting  a construction  of the  American  Union
that  foretold future  Supreme  Court  rulings protecting  slave-holding
against exclusion  or suppression  by state  law,  even in  the historically
9.  60 U.S.  (19  How.) 393 (1857).
10.  Id. at 451.
11.  See id. at 449-50.
12.  See Strader  v.  Graham, 51  U.S.  (10  How.)  82  (1850)  (holding that  states  are
free without federal supervision  to fashion their own laws for determining  the slave or
free  status  of any  person);  Prigg  v.  Pennsylvania,  41  U.S.  (16  Pet.)  539,  611,  612-13
(1842)  (holding  state  laws  unconstitutional-as  violations  of  a  power  vested
exclusively  in  Congress to  regulate  in  the  matter of fugitive slaves-insofar  as  they
might  "interrupt[],  limit[],  delay[],  or  postpone[]  the right  of  an  the  owner  to  the
immediate  possession of a the  slave,"  and  describing  the Constitution's  fugitive slave
clause  as  a  guarantee  of  security  of  property  so  vital  to  Southern  "interests  and
institutions"  that it  must be deemed  "a  fundamental  article, without  the  adoption of
which the Union could not have been formed").
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"free"  states.13  If our Ida  had shared  that  apprehension,  and  if she
had  considered  slavery to be  a  moral evil  great  enough  to outweigh
the moral and other goods of union, she might have decided, as many
Garrisonians claimed  they  did, that  this Union was not worth  saving
and hence not deserving of her continued collaboration.14
That  would  not  have  been,  however,  the  only  path  open  to  her
thinking.  Alternatively, our Ida could have believed sincerely that the
Supreme  Court  had  misconstrued  the  American  Union  as  one  that
affirmatively  condones  the institution of slavery and contemplates  its
perpetuity  in the United  States.  Along with Frederick  Douglass and
Abraham  Lincoln, she could have believed that the  Union, on a true
construction, was one that temporized with slavery, to be sure, for the
sake of union-creation, but that also was from the beginning  designed
by its framers to set slavery "in  the course of ultimate extinction."15 So
believing,  Ida could have concluded honorably that the Union, partly
for  that very  reason, was  worth  preserving.16  She,  then, would  have
followed Lincoln in treating the Dred Scott decision as  a "mistake,"  a
presumably  barren  and  doomed  judicial  act  that  did  not,  as  such,
reflect much on the respect-worthiness  of the true American system of
government;  and thus was not to be granted any "gravitational"  effect
on  other  cases  claimed  to  fall  within  its  normative  neighborhood, 7
although  also was-and this  would  be Ida's  bow to Hobbes'  thesis-
not  to be  denied  validity  as  an  act of government  demanding  to be
heeded  as such.  Ida, then, would  have  counseled  against  any  direct
13.  See, e.g.,  Abraham  Lincoln, A House  Divided: Speech  at Springfield,  Illinois
(June 16, 1858), in 2 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 461, 464-65  (Roy  P. Basler
ed.,  1953);  Abraham  Lincoln,  First  Debate  with  Stephen  A.  Douglas  at  Ottawa,
Illinois,  (Aug, 21,  1858),  in 3 Collected  Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra, at 27.  It is
not fully clear  exactly how the Supreme Court  was expected  to hinge such  a ruling to
the  constitutional  text.  The  Fifth  Amendment  itself  had  no  application  to  state
lawmaking. See Barron v. Baltimore,  32 U.S. 247  (1833).  It seems the likeliest textual
hook would have  been the Article IV, Section  2,  Privileges and Immunities  Clause of
the  U.S. Constitution.  See,  e.g.,  Lemmon  v.  People,  20  N.Y. 562  (1860),  where  the
New York court rejected  a plausible-looking  claim to the effect  that New York could
not, consistently with this clause, strip a slave-owner of his slave property by applying
its  law of personal  freedom to  slaves  being  shipped  through  the port  of New York
from one slave jurisdiction to another.
14.  See  Eric  Foner,  Free  Soil,  Free  Labor,  Free  Men:  The  Ideology  of  the
Republican  Party  Before  the  Civil  War  137-38  (1995).  William  Lloyd  Garrison
famously called the "compact...  between the North and the South" a "covenant with
death and  an agreement  with hell."  Resolution  Adopted  by the Antislavery  Society,
Jan.  27,  1843, quoted in Walter M. Merrill, Against  Wind and Tide:  A Biography  of
Wm.  Lloyd Garrison 205 (1963).
15.  E.g.,  Abraham Lincoln,  Reply  at the Debate in Jonesboro,  Illinois  (Sept. 15,
1857),  in 3  Collected  Works of Abraham  Lincoln  117  (Roy  P. Basler ed.,  1953);  see
also Frederick  Douglass,  The  Constitution of the  United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or
Anti-Slavery?, in 2 Life and  Writings of Frederick Douglass  467  (Philip S.  Foner ed.,
1950).
16.  But see Frederick Douglass, Autobiographies 704-05 (1994).
17.  Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra  note 8,  at 111.IDA'S WAY
interference  with  the  specific  civil  relationship  decreed  by the  Court
to subsist between Dred Scott and John Sanford. 8
Having  noticed  how  Ida's  intellectual  problem  resembles  that  of
Hercules, J., we ought also to notice  how her role and situation differ
from his.  Unlike Hercules, Ida  is not a public official responsible  for
specific exercises  of power over  other individuals  and the  affairs that
concern  them.  If Herc, and Herc2, each  sitting as  a judge  in his own
court, disagree  over  the true  construction  of the  system  at the  same
moment  in time-or  if, ostensibly agreeing  on the  true  construction,
they  nevertheless  disagree  over  what  it  requires  in  identical  cases
pending  before them-there  is  an apparent problem  of justice.  The
fates of the litigants then hang on which judge's court they happen  to
land in.  Of course,  there  is  an  appeals  system  designed,  in  part, to
handle this sort  of problem.  Yet if both cases travel up the appellate
pyramid, the outcomes then  will hinge  on a nose-count  among three,
seven, or  nine SuperHercs  whose several internal  moral vectors may
happen  to  diverge  in  respects  material  to  this  particular  case.
Whether  these  quirks  present  a  serious  moral  problem  is  not  a
question on which we  need  to dwell;  they have no  application to our
heroines.  No  doubt,  various  Idas  may  arrive  at  various
reconstructions  of  the  governmental  system  in  place,  owing  to
differences  in their internal moral compasses. 9  That effect,  however,
can  pose  no  direct  problem  of justice  to  parties  because  no  Ida
directly exercises any power over any party.  Whether the effect poses
some  other  sort  of  political-moral  problem  is  a  question  better  left
until later.
II.  LIBERAL LEGITIMACY:  A  BRIEF GENEALOGY
2°
A.  Liberalism  and the Pull to Consensus
I  want  now  to expand  on the  reasons  why  anyone  actually  might
18.  Ida  would  still  be  tracking  Lincoln.  See  Abraham  Lincoln,  Speech  at
Springfield, Illinois (June 26,  1857), in 2  Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 400-03
(Roy  P. Basler  ed.,  1953);  cf. Abraham  Lincoln,  Address  Before  the  Young  Men's
Lyceum  of  Springfield,  Illinois  (Jan.  27,  1838),  in  1 Collected  Works  of  Abraham
Lincoln, supra, at 112-13.
19.  See infra Part III.C.
20.  Part II  of this Article  deals in abbreviated  form with matters  I have  discussed
in  several  other  recent  writings  and  draws  substantially  from  them.  See  Frank  I.
Michelman,  The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement, in  Habermas
and  Pragmatism  (Mitchell  Aboulafia  et  al.  eds.,  2002);  Frank  I.  Michelman,
Constitutional Legitimation For Political Acts,  66  Mod.  L.  Rev.  1 (2003);  Frank  I.
Michelman,  Is the  Constitution a Contract For Legitimacy?, 8 Rev.  of Const. Stud.
(forthcoming  2003); Frank  I.  Michelman,  Living With Judicial  Supremacy, 38 Wake
Forest  L. Rev.  579  (2003);  Frank  I.  Michelman, Postmodernism, Proceduralism,  and
Constitutional  Justice: A  Comment on van  der Walt and Botha, 9  Constellations  246
(2002);  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Relative Constraint and Public Reason: What is  "The
Work We Expect of Law"?, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 963  (2002).
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believe  the  series  of  five  propositions  with  which  we  launched  this
reflection.2'  And  I want to do so by putting  a "'political liberal"  spin
on the series of beliefs.
"Liberals,"  as  I  use  the  term,  are  those  of  us  who  insist  on  the
recognition by persons  of each other as "free  and equal. 22  We insist
on acceptance of the equal claim of each person to the pursuit of a life
in accord  with aims and  ideals she adopts for  herself, and on respect
for each person's  capacity for such  a pursuit. 2 '  Liberals,  accordingly,
are committed to a sympathetic regard for the wide and deep diversity
of  ethical  outlooks,  situations,  and  interests  among  inhabitants  of  a
modern country.  Understanding that this ethical diversity gives rise to
frequent,  sincere,  and intractable  disagreements  over what  the  laws
for a society of notionally free and  equal persons ought in all reason
and  justice  to provide,  liberals  share  a  sense  of moral  obligation  to
take  political  disagreement  seriously,  respect  it,  and  try  to  work
around it.
"Political"  liberals  of this  kind-I use John  Rawls'  name  for  us-
shy  away from coercion,  of ourselves  or of others.  We  want to feel
that we  always, when called upon, can give to others "public" reasons
sufficient to justify the actual processes and practices of legal coercion
in which  we  connive.  Very roughly,  public  reasons  are  reasons  that
the  giver  sincerely  believes  ought  to  count  as  such  for  any  right-
minded  (a/k/a  "reasonable")  political  associate. 24  In  other  words,
political liberalism  is, itself, a kind  of fighting faith.  For better or for
worse, political liberals feel morally justified in restricting the circle of
those  to  whom  we  feel  bound  to  justify  our  practice  of  political
coercion  to  those  who  are  "reasonable"  like  us.  But  what  is
"reasonable?"
B.  Legal Ordering  and "Hobbes' Thesis"
I assume  most readers  take for granted that the  possibility of legal
ordering-or call it government by law-is a very good thing, morally.
A  social  practice  of  government  by  law,  we  feel  certain-at  least
assuming  it is popularly based  and is otherwise  "decent" 25-can  carry
inestimable  benefits,  for  everyone  affected,  of  social  pacification,
cooperation,  coordination,  and  justice.  The  taken-for-granted
supposition, to be clear, is not that any current governmental or legal
order cannot stand vast improvement  from the standpoints of justice,
morality,  and  efficiency.  Much more  modestly, it is  that our current
21.  See supra  Part I.A.
22.  E.g., Rawls, supra note 1, at 19,217.
23.  Liberal individualism  of this stripe is not to be confused with  "atomism."  See,
e.g., Frank I. Michelman,  Brennan and Democracy  65-67 (1999).
24.  See generally John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in John  Rawls:
Collected Papers 573 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
25.  See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 62-68 (1999).
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governmental  order,  and  others  relevantly  resembling  it,  bring  to
everyone  involved  those  mentioned,  inestimable  goods  of  the
political,26  when  the  baseline  for  comparison  is  a  world  without
government by law.  We are all, to that extent, the children of Thomas
Hobbes and-as Jeremy Waldron would want me  to add-Immanuel
Kant.27
We easily think of these great goods of the political as moral goods,
on the understanding that everyone shares in the increase to them that
results  from  any  decent  practice  of  government  by  law. 28   This
expected  flow  of  universal  benefit  can  provide  a  strong,  moral
motivation  for  the  support  of  such  practices.  It  also  offers  moral
justification  for  mobilization  of  social  pressure  and  public  force  as
required  to  ensure  compliance  by  all  with  each  and  every  law  that
issues from a currently established governmental system.29
The  reason  why  lies,  of  course, in  "Hobbes'  thesis."30  The  thesis
starts from a sense that no practice  of government by law can succeed
in  delivering  its  vaunted  moral  goods  without  the  persistence  in
society of widespread  inclinations  to comply voluntarily with the laws
(and  legal interpretations)  that issue from the practice.3'  Next comes
a belief that such inclinations cannot persist without an experientially
justified expectation  on the part of each participant that  the others-
most  of them, most of the time-will  play  by  the rules;  that  is,  they
will  more  or  less  abide  by  all  the  laws  that  issue  from  the  specific
regime  of  legal  government  that  currently  is  established  in  the
country,  not  picking  and  choosing  which  ones  they'll  respect  and
which  they'll  trash.  We  lack  confidence  that such  expectations  can
hold up  without  visible  guarantees  of institutional  backup.  We  fear
the system  will  unravel without  support from  a credible  prospect of
socially  organized compulsion waiting in the wings for cases of willful
non-compliance.3 2
All  of this  probably  will  make  good  sense  to  most  readers.  But
consider, then, the consequence  when you add  to the picture the kind
of deep, intractable, normative disagreement that recent liberal theory
26.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
27.  See  Jeremy  Waldron,  The  Dignity  of  Legislation  36-62  (1999);  Immanuel
Kant,  The Metaphysical  Elements of Justice  § 42  (John  Ladd  trans.,  1999);  Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan chs. 13-17  (M. Oakeshott ed., 1962)  (1651).
28.  It  would  be going too far  to suggest that any world  in which  government  by
law prevails must  be better for everyone  in  it, or rank higher on the  scale of what  is
right and fair, than might any realistically conceivable world from which this condition
is absent.  We  do mostly take for granted,  though, that the claim holds true  of many
historical and contemporary instances of the genus, including our own today.
29.  We  can  leave  room  for  contained  occasions  of  civil  disobedience  and
conscientious  refusal  without  much  disturbing  the  argument.  See  generally John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 319-43 (rev. ed.  1999).
30.  See supra  note 5.
31.  See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 191 (2d ed. 1994).
32.  See, e.g., Habermas, supra note 7, at 8, 28,  198 (1996).
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posits  as  endemic  in  modern  political  societies.  To  speak,  as  John
Rawls  does,  of  a  plurality  of  clashing  "comprehensive"  ethical  and
metaphysical  "views"  is not  quite  fully to  describe  our predicament.
Owing  in  part  to  what  Rawls  calls  "burdens  of judgment,"33  our
reasonable  clashes  of  "view"  extend  to  any  number  of  major  and
morally fraught  public policy choices that have  to be resolved  in one
and  only  one way  for everyone-e.g.,  under  what, if any,  conditions
may or shall the state punish abortion,  or compel taxpayer support of
religious  schools?34  The  consequence,  then,  of  our  attachments  to
government  by  law  and  to  Hobbes'  thesis  is  that  we  all  become
collaborators  in  webs  of  social  practices  that  exert  coercion  and
pressure upon persons to uphold and comply with laws that they know
in their hearts to be bad, wrong, and unjust.
Do not doubt it.  Day in, day out, by countless large and small acts
of  compliance  and  collaboration  with  our  country's  governmental
regime,  we,  with  little  compunction,  involve  ourselves  in  a  social
mobilization  of  pressure  and  force  against  persons  to  comply  with
sundry  laws and other legal  acts with which  they do not agree.  And
not  only  acts  with  which  they  do  not  agree,  but  acts  that  they
confidently  judge  to  be  quite  bad  and  wrong,  and  from  what  they
sincerely and credibly take to be a public and not just a selfish point of
view.  Since judgments of the public merits of legal  acts rarely will be
unanimous,  and  disagreements  about  this  often  will  be  not  only
intractable  and sharp but also honest  and reasonable on all sides-or
so we  liberals insist-we  may  as well  say that the benign  and  urgent
aims  of  government  by  law  require  our  willingness  to  join  in
subjecting  others  (not  to  mention  ourselves)  to  pressures  and
compulsions to abide by legal  acts that, so far as they (or we)  honestly
can  tell, simply  are  wrong,  are destructive  or unjust,  objectively  and
not  just  according  to  their  (or  our)  own  personal  assessments. 35
Liberals cannot find this a comfortable state of affairs.
33.  "Burdens  of judgment"  encompass  sundry  causes  of obdurate disagreement
about  justice  among  reasonable  persons  who  observe  and  report  honestly,  argue
cogently, and share "a  desire to honor fair terms of cooperation."  Rawls, supra note
1, at 54-58. Among these causes Rawls lists the likelihood that
the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped  by
our  total  experience,  our  whole  course  of  life  up  to  now;  and  our  total
experiences  must always differ. Thus, in  a modern society with its numerous
offices  and  positions,  its various  divisions  of labor,  its  many social  groups
and their ethnic variety,  citizens'  total experiences are  disparate  enough  for
their judgments  to  diverge,  at  least  to some  degree,  on  many  if not  most
cases of any significant complexity.
Id. at 56-57.
34.  Compare id. at 36-37  (describing  a  "reasonable  pluralism"  of comprehensive
ethical and  philosophical  views)  with Jeremy Waldron,  Law  and  Disagreement  105-
06,  112-13,  152,  158-59  (1999)  (pointing  out  the  inevitable  resulting  persistence  of
reasonable  disagreement  over  the  demands  of justice  regarding  matters  of  public
policy, including at the constitutional level).
35.  Note that the claim  here is not that there  are no right answers to questions  of
[Vol.  72IDA'S WAY
C.  The "Reasonable"
We  are  now  in  a  position to  say a  little  more,  at least,  about  the
circle  of  "reasonable"  political  associates  to whom  political  liberals
feel bound to justify their collaboration in legal coercion, in terms that
will  count  as  "public"  within  that  circle.36  Suppose  everyone  felt
perfectly  free  to  refuse  compliance  with  any  law  reflecting  or
supporting  a  public policy that  deviates  sharply from  the  dictates  of
his or her own moral convictions.  Alternatively, suppose we took it as
granted  that  each  political  associate,  as  "free  and  equal,"  has  a
morally  justified  complaint  against  the  state's  general  demand  for
compliance  with  any  law  that  so  deviates.  In  the  first  instance,
assuming the correctness  of Hobbes' thesis, no practice of government
by law could be sustained at all in an ethically diverse society.  In the
second  instance,  none  could  justifiably  be  sustained  among  an
ethically  diverse  population  of  persons  who  also  are  liberally
committed to recognize  and respect one another as free and equal.  In
either  instance,  the  very  great  goods  of  the  political  would  be
unattainable  in  any  liberal  society  where  the  fact  of  reasonable
pluralism obtained.  "Reasonable"  political associates,  it may now be
said,  are  limited  to  those  who  are  moved  by  these  perceptions  of
impossibility  to  reject  the  assumption  that  anyone  is  free  to  refuse
compliance with laws that don't conform to the dictates of his or her
considered  moral  convictions,  and  that  anyone  has  a  justified
complaint  against  state  enforcement  of  any  law  that  does  not  so
conform.  "Reasonable"  associates include  only those who  share  the
same  resulting  liberal  spirit  of  reciprocity  and  forbearance  that
motivates  "us."  John Rawls calls it "civility. 37
D.  "Proceduralism"
Even  within  the  circle  of  the  reasonable  thus  defined,  we  must
expect protracted  and contentious disagreements  over major, morally
fraught issues of public policy.  If only owing to burdens of judgment,38
reasonable  people  in  ethically  diverse  societies  disagree  sharply,
deeply,  and obdurately  over the  moral  and other practical  merits  of
policies regarding such matters  as affirmative  action, abortion, school
vouchers,  public  religious  exercises,  restriction  of money in  politics,
and the death penalty,  to name  a few.  Is political  liberalism, then, a
project beyond reach?
political justice and prudence.  The problem  is that there  are  no publicly  established
answers to many of these questions, and  aren't likely to be,  in real political  time, as
long as "reasonable pluralism"  is true of our countries.
36.  See supra Part II.A.
37.  Rawls, supra note 24, at 576.
38. See supra  notes 33-34.
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Enter  the  "procedural"  turn  in  contemporary  liberal  theories  of
political  justification.  John Rawls  provides  a  leading example  in his
proposed  "liberal  principle  of  legitimacy."  "[O]ur  exercise  of
[coercive]  political  power,"  that principle  runs,  "is  proper  and hence
justifiable  only when  it is  exercised  in accordance  with a constitution
the  essentials  of  which  all  citizens  may  reasonably  be  expected  to
endorse  in  the  light  of  principles  and  ideals  acceptable  to  them  as
reasonable  and rational."39
For  Rawls,  the  category  of  "constitutional  essentials"  includes
guarantees  regarding  the  substance  of  the  law,  not  just  the
institutional and  procedural  protocols for making it.4"  In what sense,
then,  can  it  be  said  that  Rawls  proposes  a  "procedural"  test  for
political justification?  "Procedural,"  in this context, does not mean a
test  concerned  only  with  matters  of  lawmaking  process  as
distinguished from the content of the legal  product.  It rather means a
test that is  abstracted or deflected from  issues of morality  and public
policy that are obdurately and divisively controversial in society.
People who can't just go their separate ways, or don't want  to, and
who also can't agree  on what  really ought to be done  by or for all  of
them together, may sometimes be able to find agreement on a method
for  settling what  actually  is  to  be  done  next.  If several  friends find
themselves  quarreling  over  which  movie  to  see  tonight  but  are
determined  to  stick  together  in  any  case,  maybe  they  can  agree  to
"bracket"  their quarrel by a coin flip.  If members  of society find  they
can't,  in  real  political  time,  agree  on  the  morality  or  utility  of  a
government-dictated  wages  policy,  maybe  they  still  can  agree  to let
the matter be  resolved  from time to time  by  laws made  according  to
the  rules  laid  down  in a constitution.  Their agreed practice  for  pro
tempore  legal  settlement  then  is  the  "procedure,"  and  the  on-going,
unresolved,  bracketed  disagreement  of  morality  or  policy  is  the
"substance."  Proceduralism  thus  implies  a  resort  to  what  we  may,
with apologies to Rawls, call a "method  of avoidance."41
As should  now be clear, some  matters that undoubtedly  would be
classed  as  "substantive"  in  other  contexts  play  a  "proceduralizing"
role  in  Rawls'  liberal  principle  of  legitimacy.  The  thought  is  that
reasonable  people  can  all  agree  to  the  moral  authority  of  a  certain
constitutional system for resolving all the (other) politically decidable
39.  Rawls, supra note 1, at 217.
40.  See  id. at  227  (including  among  "constitutional  essentials"  the  "equal  basic
rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities  are to respect:  such  as the
right to  vote and  to  participate  in politics, liberty  of conscience, freedom  of thought
and of association, as well as the protections  of the rule of law").
41.  John  Rawls, Justice as Fairness:  Political  not Metaphysical, in Rawls: Collected
Papers  388,  395  (Samuel  Freeman  ed.,  1999)  ("The  hope  is that..,  this  method  of
avoidance ...  may  enable  us to conceive  how, given  a desire  for free  and  uncoerced
agreement, a public understanding could  arise consistent with the historical conditions
and constraints of our social world.").
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questions that might  come before  the country from  time to time, but
only if that system includes guarantees against infringement of certain
interests  or  rights  that  undoubtedly  are  substantive  in  ordinary
thought:  freedom  from  enslavement,  for  example,  or  freedom  of
thought and conscience, or an aptly qualified right to hold property. 42
In  other words,  a constitutional  bill of "substantive"  rights  can be
understood  as  the  product  of  a  "proceduralist"  impulse  to  deflect
attention  from  those  politically  decidable  questions  on  which
members  of society  cannot reasonably  be expected  or called upon  to
agree to  a set of more abstract rules and principles  defining a general
political system for producing pro tempore institutional settlements of
contested  issues  of public  policy.  On this  set of rules  and principles
(or political system), all reasonable participants  should find they have
sufficient  reason to agree.  To put the idea a bit crudely:  Reasonable
people,  aware of those  inestimable benefits of government  by law we
keep  harping on, and sharing  a belief in Hobbes'  thesis, can agree  to
take their chances on a recognizably  democratic governmental system
whose  performance  is guaranteed  to  stay  within the  constraints  of a
good, liberal, constitutional  bill of rights.
If so,  then  it seems  it  should  be  possible  to  sustain  a  practice  of
government  by  law  among  an  ethically  diverse  society  of  free  and
equal,  reasonable  and  rational  persons-including  insistence,  if  that
be thought necessary, on conformance by everyone to all the laws that
issue from the system.  All one needs is the right kind of constitution,
one  suited to the work that the legitimation project-so to name it-
calls  for.  If the  constitution  is  one  that  no  reasonable  person  can
reject as unworthy of the kind of respect that the project  calls for, and
if unconstitutional  laws are  more or less  guaranteed  to get sooner or
later knocked  out, then  (it follows  trivially)  no reasonable  person can
complain about  the  state's demand  for everyone's  support  of all the
laws that make it through the constitutional-legal  screen.
E.  "Legitimacy"
And so we reach the notion of a "legitimate"  law.  A legitimate law
is not necessarily a commendable  one, nor even necessarily one that is
consonant with justice.  A law is legitimate, in your eyes, if you believe
the state  is,  so to speak, within its rights in enforcing  that law against
you  and everyone -regardless  of whether  you also  believe  that  law,
taken on its own merits, to be quite  awful.  Such a notion, obviously,
will be at home only in the mind of a person who, being reasonable  (in
our  special  sense  of the  term), 43  is  able  to see  how the  state can  be
acting  in a  morally  proper way  when  it  seeks  to enforce,  against  all
alike,  all  the  laws  that  issue  duly  from  the  governmental  system
42.  See Rawls, supra  note 1, at 291, 298.
43.  See supra Part II.C.
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currently  in  force,  notwithstanding  the  undoubted  fact  that  always
among  those  laws  will  be  some  that  some  inhabitants, sincerely  and
very possibly  correctly,  condemn  as  bad and  wrong.  The  core  of  a
"legitimacy"  plea  thus  consists  of two  propositions:  first,  that  our
country's total, extant  system of government  by law is morally worth
preserving  (and  here  we  would  always  implicitly  be  adding,
considering  the  realistically  available  alternatives);  and,  second
("Hobbes'  thesis"),  that preserving  it  requires  recognition  all-round
that the state  is, so to speak, within its rights enforcing  every law that
issues  from  the  system, including  even  some  very  bad  and  immoral
ones.
Such  a notion of  legal  legitimacy,  if it  can  be  sustained,  plainly  is
one of very  high moral import.  The  point of it, after  all,  is to justify
morally  what  otherwise  would  appear  to  be  unjustifiable  to  any
liberal;  that is, participation  in compulsion  against others to abide by
laws that they know, as may we, to be bad and wrong.
III. SOME VARIATIONS  ON SYSTEM  CONSTRUCTION
A.  The System as Majority Rule
Suppose  you accept all that has preceded.  Belief in the great goods
of government  by  law, along with Hobbes'  thesis, provides the major
premise  for  what  we  may  call  a  legitimation  project,  meaning  a
possible justification of collaboration  in the enforcement  of all laws-
right  or wrong, good or bad-issuing from  a governmental  system in
place.  The  respect-worthiness  of the  governmental  system  in  place
supplies a requisite minor premise for the project.  The major premise
is fixed, but the minor premise is variable; that is, its truth depends on
a  judgment  one  makes  regarding  the  respect-worthiness  of  the
particular governmental system currently in place.44
Then  comes  the  question:  How  ought  we  conceive  of  the
"governmental  system  in  place,"  the  claimed  moral  desirability  of
preserving  which  supplies  a  needed  premise  for  general  political
justification?  By what mental and discursive processes might we most
44.  By  speaking of the system as being "in place," I do not mean to suggest it must
be conceived  as  closed  to change.  The system  may  be conceived  to  include devices
for  change,  or  avenues  to  change,  and  these  may  be  among  its  most  normatively
significant features.  All that is signified  by  "in  place"  is that  anyone  trying to gauge
the moral  adequacy  of the  system to  render  legitimate  the governmental  acts  that
issue from it will have to be able to say what the system  is.  If his account  of it is going
to include  its built-in devices for change, or avenues to change, he will have to be able
to say what they are.  If they  are plastic, uncertain, or in flux-as we well  may have
reason  to  wish  them  to be-he still  will  have  to  be  able  to  say something,  at least,
about  what  the  devices/avenues  for resolving  them  are.  And  so  on.  See Frank  I.
Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional  Theory, 13  Ratio Juris 63
(2000); Frank I. Michelman,  "Protecting  the People from Themselves,"  or How Direct
Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1717, 1728-30,  1733-34 (1998).
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aptly construct our images  of what "the  system"  is in order to gauge
its respect-worthiness  as a system?
Jeremy  Waldron  presents  possibilities  for  what  we  may  call-
comparing  it with John  Rawls'  proposal"5-a  radically proceduralized
theory of "the  governmental  system in place."46  Perhaps it  is possible
for political associates at any time to agree on whether lawmaking and
related  public-policy  choices  are  or  are  not  being  accomplished  by
means that are consistent with the principle of majority rule, including
being  open  to  revision  by  majoritarian  means. 7  The  chances  for
convergence  among  the reasonable  on such  a judgment  may, at any
rate,  seem substantially better than the chances  that a typical,  liberal
bill  of  constitutional  rights,  as  actually  construed  and  applied,  can
confidently be pronounced  acceptable  to everyone  who is  reasonable
and  rational. 4"  Perhaps,  also,  the  fact  that  a  law  was  made  in
compliance  with  the  requirements  of  a  procedurally  majoritarian
constitutional  system can  itself suffice  to render the law legitimate in
the eyes of everyone  who is  reasonable  in a political-liberal  sense  of
that term.
My  use  of  the  term  "legitimate,"  there,  carries  Waldron's
explorations  one  step beyond  where  he, himself, has carried  them so
far.49  Yet Waldron  does, in  effect,  ask us to  consider  the  possibility
that my use of the term might be warranted.  He wants  us to consider
that  giving  full  sway  to  majority  rule  may  yet  prove  an  apt  and
practical way  to combine  a robust respect  for difference,  and for the
normatively  free  and  equal  status of persons,  with a  like respect  for
the  goods  of the  political5"  now  expressly  understood  to  encompass
certain  communitarian  moral  goods  of  social  collaboration  and
collective  action.51  The hypothesis would  be that a firm commitment
to  majority  rule-at  least  under  certain,  favorable  conditions  of
political  culture  and  "self-understanding"52   (compare  "the
reasonable")-can  both  give  us  the  moral  justification  we  need,  as
liberals,  for  collaboration  in  enforcement  of  the  resulting  laws,
45.  See supra  Part II.D.
46.  See Waldron, supra  note 34, at 282-312.
47.  See  id. at 300-01,  305-06.  I have doubted  it.  See  Michelman,  "Protecting  the
People From  Themselves,"  or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, supra note  44,  at
1728-34.  Waldron  appreciates  the  difficulty. See Waldron, supra note 34,  at  292-95,
298, 299-300.
48.  See Waldron, supra  note 34, at 294-95, 306-07; infra Part III.B.
49.  See Waldron, supra  note 34, at 299-300.
50.  See id. at 295-96, 303-05.
51.  See id.
[T]he  demand  that  interests  me...  is  a  demand  for  a  certain  sort  of
recognition  and ...  respect-that  this,  for  the  time  being,  is  what  the
community has come up with and that it should not be ignored or disparaged
simply because some of us propose, when we can, to repeal it.
Id. at 100 (emphasis omitted).
52.  Id. at 308.
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including wrong ones, and, at the same time, carry out the right sort of
respect both for individuality and  disagreement  and for each other  as
political associates and co-operators.53
This is a bold venture, and a surprising one coming from as staunch
a defender of liberal rights ideas as Waldron.54  Majority  rule has run
into famous objections (which  Waldron looks squarely in the eye55) as
a  solution  to the  problem  of  combining  government  by law  with  a
devotion to both individual autonomy and respect  for difference.  The
slogan "tyranny of the majority" is enough to bring these objections  to
mind.  In  the  political-liberal  perspective,  the  question  is  whether  it
could  be  thought  reasonable  to call  on everyone,  as reasonable  but
also  as  rational,  to  submit  their  fates  to  a  majoritarian  lawmaking
system  without  also  committing  our  society,  from  the  start,  to  run
itself  in  ways  designed  to  constitute  and  sustain  every  person  as  a
competent  and  respected  contributor  to  political  exchange  and
contestation and furthermore to social and economic life at large.56  A
negative answer  is  not prima facie  implausible,  and it would  seem  to
be  what  drives  a thinker like  Rawls  toward  his  more  substantivized
sort of proceduralism.  Without  trying finally  to adjudicate  the  issue
thus  posed  between  Rawls  and  Waldron,  we  can  say  that  a  major
question for  Waldron  is  whether  the majoritarian  principle  standing
alone  is  too  "thin"  a  base  on  which  to  rear  a  political-liberal
legitimation project.57
B.  The System as the Set of Constitutional  Essentials
It seems that the  Rawlsian  answer must  face  a converse  challenge.
Despite appearances  and apparent intentions, the "liberal principle of
legitimacy"  may  yield  too  thick  a  conception  of  the  governmental
system in place to support a political-liberal legitimation project.
Suppose  a  country  has  in  place  a  "supreme  law"-type  of written
constitution  containing  entrenched  recitals  of  rights  against  the
government.  We  might  ask  what,  if  anything,  that  fact  about  the
country  has  to  do  with  constructing  the  "governmental  system  in
place,"  whose respect-worthiness  might supply the  major premise for
a legitimation  project.  If we were constructing the system the way Ida
does,  as  an interpreted  governmental  totality, 58  the answer  would  be
"probably  something but by no means  everything."  As we  observed
53.  See id. at 302-06.
54.  See Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (1993).
55.  Waldron, supra note 34, at 298-302.
56.  See Frank  1. Michelman,  The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political
Justification,  1 Int'l J. Const. L.  13, 22-25  (2003).  Waldron agrees. See, e.g., Waldron,
supra note 34, at 284-85.
57.  See  Michelman,  The  Problem of  Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement,
supra note 20, at 113,  120.
58.  See supra  Parts I.B, I.C.
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while presenting Ida's way,59 that way involves no necessity to identify
any  separate  and distinct  body  of law  called  "constitutional,"  and  it
makes  no necessary  demand  for  an entrenched,  supreme-law  sort of
constitution  containing  substantive  guarantees.  If such  a  thing does
happen in fact to be there, as a part of a given country's governmental
totality,  any Ida's  appraisal  of  the respect-worthiness  of that  totality
probably  will  take  its presence  into  account.60  It  also  will  take into
account any judicial rulings issued in its name that currently, as matter
of fact, form  a  part of the  country's  governmental  system.  But  if it
happens  that no such  thing is there, the  absence  of it neither defeats
appraisal  nor  points  toward  a  negative  appraisal.  Historically,  they
have not had such a thing in the United Kingdom, and yet affirmative,
legitimacy-sustaining  judgments  of  their  governmental  totality  have
not  thereby  been  rendered  unimaginable.  Yes,  one  can  argue,  as
many recently have done with some degree of success in the U.K., that
it  would  be  on  the  whole  helpful  toward  that end  to  introduce  the
device  of entrenched, supreme, substantive  constitutional rights.  The
point  on  which  I  insist  is  that  one can  easily  conceive  of  a  respect-
worthy governmental  system  without ever  having  the idea  of such  a
device enter one's head.61
That  is,  assuming  we  are  doing  it  Ida's  way.  If  we  are  doing  it
Rawls'  way, the  answer is very different.  According to Rawls'  liberal
principle  of  legitimacy,62  the  project  can  be  carried  off only  if  the
regnant  set  of  constitutional  essentials  is  one  that  no  reasonable
person  can  reject  as  unworthy  of  the  kind  of  respect  that  the
legitimation project calls for, with the result that no reasonable person
then can complain about the state's demand for everyone's support of
all the laws that make it through the constitutional-legal  screen.63  So,
for Rawls, a constitution there must be, in the sense of a distinctly and
separately  identifiable  body  of  higher-law  norms.  That  set  of
constitutional  norms  is  what  supplies  the  procedure  to  which
inhabitants  resort  in  order  to get  some  resolution  of  their  expected,
obdurate  divisions  over the  substance  of major public policy choices.
It turns out, though, that there are grounds for doubting whether, in a
society  where  the  fact  of  reasonable  pluralism  obtains  in  full  force,
any  possible  constitution  could  meet  the  test  required  by  Rawls'
political-liberal  procedural  principle-i.e.,  be  non-rejectable  by
reasonable  persons  as  unworthy  of  the  kind  of  respect  that  the
59.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
60.  See Sanford  Levinson,  Constitutional Faith  180 (1988).  Levinson refers to the
Constitution  as a "presence"  that may  or may not be deemed  "encouraging"  to  "the
establishment  of a more perfect  Union." Id.
61.  See Waldron, supra note 34, at 287-88.
62.  See supra text accompanying note 39.
63.  At least,  that will  be  true  if some  limited  allowance  is  made  for constrained
events of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal. See supra note 29.
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legitimation  project  calls for-and  still  do the  work  that  the  project
calls for.
To  describe  the  problem  briefly:'  A  constitution's  substantive
guarantees are cast in abstract formulations, and not by accident, for it
seems  they  would  have  to  be  thus  cast  in  order  (this  is  the
proceduralist move) to prescind from morally divisive, major issues of
public policy.  It is not clear, however, that this method of avoidance
can work.  One can't, after all, judge a constitutional  system in place
respect-worthy  (or  not)  without  having  in  hand  an  adequate
description  of what the  system  is.  Of course,  there  is  a  nominal  or
textual  "Constitution"  available  for  examination  at  any  time.  The
question, though,  is  whether  anyone  can  have  in  hand  an adequate
description  of  the  actual  constitutional  system-in-place,  until  that
ever-receding  moment  arrives when judges  and other political actors
finally  will  have  finished  the  work  of  resolving  reasonable
uncertainties  and debates  about  the textual  constitution's bearing  on
questions the text may have had to refrain from answering, in order to
achieve  a  plausible  claim  to  non-rejectability,  for  legitimation
purposes,  by any reasonable  political  associate.  Can I pronounce the
system  to have  that character  in  virtue  of the  nominal constitution's
"equality"  clause,  without  knowing  what  the  system  does  about
affirmative  action?  Can  I  so  pronounce  it in  virtue  of the  nominal
constitution's  "life"  clause,  without  knowing  what  the  system  does
about capital punishment?  And  so on.  If not, then it seems that the
respect-worthiness  of any constitution, under an  adequately complete
description  of it,  will  be  subject  to  the  same  intractable,  reasonable
disagreements  over major policy choices that  the procedural  move is
meant to work around.  The set of constitutional essentials,  described
with  adequate  completeness  to support the legitimation  project,  bids
fair  to  become  too  thick  to  secure  the  agreement-hypothetical,
among the reasonable-that the project requires.
We don't have to decide  right here on the ultimate force of this line
of  critique  of  Rawls'  proposed,  bill-of-rights  centered  version  of  a
proceduralized,  political-liberal  justification  of  coercive,  lawmaking
power.  (I, myself, remain uncertain  about it).  It is enough, for now,
to feel the bite of the critique.  That will set us up to ask whether Ida's
way may not be more promising than either Waldron's  (too thin?)  or
Rawls'  (too thick?).
C. Ida's Way:  The System as the Rationally Reconstructed
Governmental Totality
If Ida's way does have some advantage over the other two, it is  not
because hers is any less "proceduralist"  than the others are.  Let us be
clear about that.  It is Ida's anticipation of deep, obdurate, reasonable
64.  I go into it more fully in various papers cited in notes 20 & 44, supra.
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disagreement  at  the  major  public  policy  level  that  drives  her,  as  a
consensus-seeking  political  liberal,  to  her  felt  need  to  produce  an
account  (construction)  of  the  governmental-system-in-place-which,
by being respect-worthy  (if it is), can justify support  of a government
demanding  everyone's  compliance  with  all  of  its  laws.  This
constructed  government-in-place  plays  a proceduralizing  role  in Ida's
political-liberal  thought  analogous  to  that  which  the  set  of
constitutional essentials plays in Rawls'.
Inevitably,  reasonable  disagreement  is going  to reach  its  tentacles
into  the  system-constructions  arrived  at  by sundry  Idas  all  acting  in
the  best  of  faith.  We  can  see  this  by  returning  to  our  previous
example.
We  left our Lincolnesque,  1857  Ida at  odds  with the  Garrisonians
over  which  construction  of  the  American  Union  (long-term  slavery
protective, or not) made, at the time, the closer, least-squares  fit  with
all the  relevant data.  No doubt,  one can  imagine Ida's disagreement
with  the  Garrisonians  being  strictly  a  matter  of  interpretation,  not
evaluation.  That is, one can  imagine the two sides agreeing perfectly
on  the weight of the  general moral  goods  of union  preservation  and
likewise on the lack of preservation-worthiness  of a slavery-protective
union,  even  as  they  nevertheless  disagree  over  (and  only  over)  how
most  accurately  to  interpret  (rationally  reconstruct)  the  specific,
American  Union in  question.  How certain  can  we be,  though-how
certain  can  the  parties  be-that  the  difference  in  their  Union-
constructions  is  not  a  direct  reflection  of  a  difference  in  the  moral
weights  they  respectively  attach  to  the  moral  odiousness  of slavery
and the general values of system-preservation?  Can their interpretive
disagreement  really  be  guaranteed  independent  of  their  respective,
possibly divergent moral "priors?"
It seems there always will be room both for choice among plausible
reconstructions  of "the  system"  and  for differing  assessments  of the
respect-worthiness  of the system according to whatever construction is
chosen.  It is hard not to suspect that the differing constructions are in
some  degree  correlated  to  the  differing  assessments  and  that  they
both  spring  directly  from  differing  moral  priors  regarding  the
directions  and  degrees  of  moral  superiority  and  inferiority  of
particular  reconstructions.  Any  individual  social  critic's  mental  and
discursive  processes  of  system-reconstruction  undoubtedly  are
invaded  by  moral vectors, and the results arrived at by various critics
undoubtedly  are riven by divergence  of some of the vectors arising in
their  several  minds.  A  given  critic's  rationally  reconstructed
governmental  totality  thus  seems  no  likelier  than  a  completely
described set of constitutional essentials  (i.e., after  the tenors  of their
applications  to  major,  divisive  public  policy  questions  have  been
authoritatively  resolved)  to  figure  persuasively  as  an  object  of
hypothetical consensus among the reasonable.
2003]FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless,  Ida's  way  may  hold  a  significant  advantage  over
Rawls'  way.  Every Ida who accepts Hobbes'  thesis and who attaches
great  moral  importance  to  the  general  goods  of  union  has  strong,
moral reasons to wish for a favorable judgment regarding the respect-
worthiness  of  the  system-in-place  as  she  reconstructs  it.  All
reasonable Idas, therefore, have reason to be tolerant of what they see
as  moral  mishaps  in the  systemic history-specifically,  by writing off
those  mishaps  as  "mistakes."  In  short,  the  Idas  all  may  tend  to
construe  the system, insofar as the  facts permit, in ways  that to them
are morally optimistic.  Since their moral priors will differ, so will the
systemic  reconstructions  they arrive  at.  And  this  is a  political-moral
advantage,  not  a  disadvantage!  The  plurality  of the  reconstructions
the  Idas  arrive  at  will  be  precisely  geared  to  a  convergence  across
their  number  of favorable  judgments  of  respect-worthiness  of their
country's  political  "procedure"-which  is  exactly  what  political
liberals are driving at.
Would  it  be  going  too  far  to  suggest  that  we  see  here  quite
graphically what John Rawls had in mind in speaking of the possibility
of  an  overlapping  political-moral  consensus  among  differing,
comprehensive  views of morality,'  bearing in mind that the  goods of
union, or of the political-a perception  of which  is what  all the  Idas
share,  making  the overlap  possible-may  well  be  regarded  as  moral
goods?
66
It  seems-strikingly-that  the  same  hope  for  an  overlapping
consensus  cannot  be  held  out,  in  the  same  way,  for  Rawls'  own,
constitution-focused  liberal  principle  of legitimacy.  That  is  because
Rawls'  proposed  principle contains an  indissoluble kernel  of legalism
and contractualism.  That set of "constitutional essentials"  upon which
Rawls  hypothesizes  a  possible  universal  agreement  among  the
reasonable  is a law.  It may not be  simply a law, or nothing but a law,
but it figures for Rawls as a law however else it also may figure.  As a
law,  it must have  the same  applied meaning  for everyone.  It cannot
mean  simultaneously  "yes"  and  "no"  to affirmative  action.  At  any
given  moment  of controversy,  it  must  be  held  by some  Hercules  to
mean the one or other, one and the same meaning for you and for me.
In Rawls'  principle, in other words,  the constitutional essentials  serve
as  a  kind of  a  political  contract-the  adequately  described  terms of
which,  one  fears,  will  be  either  too  thick  or  too  thin  to  carry  the
weight of a political-liberal legitimation project.67
No  such  fear  need  attach  to  the  governmental  totalities  the  Idas
variously  construct.  A  governmental  totality  is  not  a contract  that
binds  anyone;  it  is  just  a  picture  of  an  empirically  existent  social
65.  See John  Rawls,  The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, in Rawls:  Collected
Papers 421 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); Rawls, supra note 1, at 133-72.
66.  See supra Part II.B.
67.  See Michelman, Living With Judicial  Supremacy, supra  note 20.
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practice.  Although that existent practice-totality  is composed,  in part,
of  laws  meant  to  be  binding,  no  Ida's  reconstruction  of  it  has  the
binding force  of a law.  (Ida,  to repeat, is  not  a legal  official.68)  The
existent  practice  we  call  the  governmental  totality  is  real,  no doubt,
and  so  it  is,  on  some  level  of possible  description,  the  same  for  all
participants.  But  there  is  no  reason  why  every  single  participant
cannot or should not perceive  it differently and describe  it differently
and thereby  accommodate  the  pull  each  reasonable  participant  will
feel, for good reason, toward finding it respect-worthy.69  Chartres can
be reported  beautiful  unanimously,  by  numerous,  competent  critics,
all  regarding  it  partially  from  their several,  differing  angles  of  view.
And  the  case  also  quite  possibly  could  be  that  Chartres  truly  is
beautiful, although no one ever will see it "whole."
68.  See supra  Part IC,  concluding paragraph.
69.  See supra  Parts  I.A, II.C.
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